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Abstract—This paper proposes a resilient distributed control
approach for the voltage regulation problem in distribution
networks with high penetration of photovoltaic systems. Aiming
to reduce the network power loss and curtailment of photovoltaic
active power generation, an objective function is formulated
while subjecting to physical operation constraints. With feedback-
based information, the proposed solution to optimal voltage
regulation can be implemented in an online and distributed
manner that ensures a real-time regulation response to fast
voltage fluctuations. The proposed approach provides a cyber-
secure solution that mitigates attack impacts on voltage control
based on a weighted mean subsequence reduced technique. The
proposed approach further addresses potential cyber-threats to
the information and communication-based control of distributed
PV inverters. Numerical studies on the IEEE 37-bus distribution
system verify that the proposed approach achieves the optimal
voltage regulation performance while ensuring the resilience.
Index Terms—Resilient control, distributed algorithm, voltage
regulation, mean subsequence reduced algorithm, distribution
systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The operation of power systems will be beneficial from the
development of photovoltaic (PV) generation units, especially
for distribution networks (DNs) [1]. However, installing PV
units substantially with significant variability could pose un-
expected challenges, i.e., voltage violations in the low-voltage
DNs [2].
Traditional voltage regulation approaches by on-load tap
changers, step-voltage regulators and shunt capacitors are in a
slow time-scale. These approaches would be insufficient for a
DN with high PV penetration since the fast fluctuation of solar
energy [3]. Results in recent works have shown the capacity
of controlling PV inverters to provide the voltage regulation
service to the DNs [4], [5].
Conventionally, voltage control approaches are implemented
in a centralised structure that shares information with a control
centre [5], [6]. The centralised approach has several bottle-
neck, e.g., the single point failure and scalability. Recently,
different control approaches have been proposed for voltage
regulation in DNs from different perspectives according to
their communication structure and communication require-
ment: such as the centralised [5]–[7], decentralised [8], [9]
and distributed approaches [10], [11]. However, as shown in
[12], the decentralised approaches using only local information
would result in a sub-optimal and even unstable solution.
In contrast, the distributed control structure is a promising
solution to address this issue, which utilises effectively infor-
mation exchanging among distributed generators (DGs) by a
communication network [13]. Studies in [11], [14] have suc-
cessfully shown the benefits of applying distributed structures
to voltage regulation through controlling the curtailment of PV
active power generation and the reactive power output from
PV inverters.
The aforementioned distributed approaches to voltage reg-
ulation highly rely on the information and communication
between PV inverters, leveraging advanced communication
networks, and in turn it exposes them to future cyber attacks.
Authors in [15] investigated the cyber-security of future mi-
crogrids and the importance of resilience in network-based
control of power systems. For a communication-based control
structure, both communication and control layers can be
potential targets for cyber-attacks, e.g., denial-of-service (DoS)
attack targeting the communication layer [16] and False data
injection (FDI) attack targeting the sensor and control layers
[17]. Many cyber-secure and resilient approaches for control
layers have been reported to distributed microgrid control
design [17], [18]. However, none of them investigated the
voltage regulation problem in DNs.
This paper focuses on the FDI attacks on the control layer
targeting the sensor and controller of PV inverters. From
this perspective, this paper proposes a resilient distributed
control approach aiming to mitigate secure intrusion during
the voltage regulation process. An optimisation problem is first
introduced to reduce network power losses and PV curtailment
costs with voltage limits as operation constraints. The sparsity
of distribution network matrices enables a distributed imple-
mentation of our solution. Recently, a weighted mean subse-
quence reduced (wMSR) framework has been reported in the
research of multi-agent systems under adversaries [19]. The
wMSR-based framework is a systematic technique to discard
the extremely information shared by units in a communication
network, which has been successfully applied in different
application areas [20], [21]. Taking advantages of the wMSR-
based framework, the proposed solution is resilient to FDI
attacks aiming to destabilise voltage profiles in DNs. Unlike
the existing solutions, the proposed wMSR-based framework
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features local computation and verification. Hence, introducing
this framework does not affect the distributed implementation
of the original voltage control approach. It further provides a
cyber-secure solution to the voltage regulation problem. The
effectiveness of the proposed strategy is verified by numerical
studies in a modified IEEE 37-bus system, where the fully AC
power flow is adopted to assess its performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model and problem formulation. In
Section III, a resilient distributed control algorithm is devel-
oped. Section IV illustrates the case study. Finally, Section V
provides the conclusion and future works.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Branch flow model for a distribution network
Let N ∪ {0} be the set of buses in a radial DN, where
|N | = N represents all branch buses and {0} is the feeder
bus. Define a set of the neighbouring buses of jth bus as Nj
that includes jth bus but excluding the feeder bus. The branch
power flow of a DN is generally non-convex [22]. In this
work, a widely adopted linearised branch flow (LinDistFlow)
model is used to facilitate a distributed design, which neglects
line losses and assumes the flat voltage. Assuming the voltage
magnitude of a reference bus v0 is constant, and the voltage
magnitude at ith bus is vi with v := [v1, . . . , vN ]T collecting
all measured voltage magnitudes, the following model is








Qjk − qj (1b)
vi − vj = rijPij + xijPij , (1c)
where Pij /Qij is the active/reactive power flow from ith bus
to jth bus; pj /qj is the active/reactive power injection at jth
bus; rij and xij are the resistance and reactance of each line
(i, j) ∈ E , respectively, where E := {(i, j),∀i, j ∈ N} is
the set of line branches. Denoting p = [p1, . . . , pN ]T and
q = [q1, . . . , qN ]T , (1) can be written compactly as
v = Rp +Xq + v01 (2)
where 1 is an N-dimensional vector with all entries being
1. R := D−TMrD−1 where D is the line-bus incidence
matrix and Mr ∈ RN×N is a diagonal matrix with rij being
the diagonal entry; and similarly for X := D−TMxD−1.
Following [11], D is a positive definite matrix and D−1 is
a weighted Laplacian matrix with sparsity.
It should be noted that the accuracy of the LinDistFlow
model has been numerically corroborated by several recent
works on voltage regulation [11], [23]. Note that although this
study adopts the LinDistFlow model, the numerical studies
utilise voltage magnitudes calculated by a fully AC power flow
model in the algorithm update.
B. Problem Formulation of Voltage Regulation
In this subsection, the voltage regulation problem is formu-
lated. Write the power and reactive power injections pj and qj
as pj = pmj − pvj − plj and qj = qvj − qlj , where pvj and qvj are
respectively the active curtailment power and reactive power
injected by an inverter of a PV unit at jth bus; pmj denotes
the maximum available active power from jth PV unit; plj /q
l
j
is the active/reactive power demand at jth bus. In this study,
PVs are considered as controllable units that provide voltage
regulation through optimal inverter dispatch [5].
The objective of a voltage controller is to regulate voltage to
an acceptable range by optimally adjusting active and reactive
power injections while ensuring the physical relationship (2).
Specifically, the following objective of voltage regulation is
formulated,
1) Objective function: The following cost functions are
introduced to ensure optimal voltage regulation
• Network loss: as in [11], the network loss is approximated
by








where v0 is the voltage magnitude at the substation bus
and assuming v0 = 1 p.u., the above function can be
further rewritten as following






= pTRp + qTRq (4)
where the facts −MT P = p and −MT Q = q from (1a)
and (1b) are used to derive the last equality.
• PV operation cost: In addition to the network loss, PV
units in voltage regulation service should be operated
considering their operation costs. This study assumes
their costs are evaluated by convex quadratic functions
while considering the network topology, i.e.,
c(pv) = [pv]TRpv, (5)
where pv is the vector collecting pvi , ∀i ∈ N ; R collects
information about the network topology, and thus the
formulated cost functions can be interpreted as penalties
for the power output from PV units at different locations.
2) Operational constraints:
• Voltage constraint: system voltage profiles should be
within the acceptable range [vi, v̄i]
vi ≤ vi ≤ v̄i, ∀i ∈ N , (6)
where vi and v̄i are the lower and upper voltage limits.
• Power constraint: the active and reactive power output
from the inverters of each PV unit should not exceed
the power capacity. The operation regions of active and
reactive power of PV inverters can be respectively written
by,




2 − (pvi )2, ∀i ∈ N , (8)
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where Svi is the rated apparent power of the PV inverter.
The following linearisation are introduced to decouple the
P-Q correlation in (8),
qv
i




2 − (pmi )2 and qvi = −q̄
v
i are the
upper and lower limits of the reactive power from the
PV inverter, respectively.
3) Optimisation problem: Overall, the optimisation prob-









s.t v ≤ vo −Rpv +Xqv ≤ v̄ (10b)
(7) and (9), (10c)
where vo := v01 + R(pm − pl) − Xql; wl and wv are
the weighting factors for network loss minimisation and cost
reduction, respectively. In (10a) the first term can be rewritten
as l(p,q) = (pm − pv − pl)TR(pm − pv − pl) + (qv −
ql)TR(qv − ql). For convenience, the following sections use
f to represent (10a). Note that the formulation of f will
turn out that the voltage controller only depends on the local
information and neighbouring information as in Section III,
which makes the designed solution compatible with a feedback
design using a fully ac power flow.
The voltage regulation problem can be solved by centralised
or decentralised methods. However, as illustrated in [12], using
only local information, these methods could not guarantee the
success of voltage regulation. Although results on distributed
voltage control have been recently introduced [11], [23], they
fail to converge or even result in an unstable system if there
exist adversaries in the communication network. To address
this issue, the following section will introduce a resilient
voltage control approach.
III. RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED CONTROL FOR REAL-TIME
VOLTAGE REGULATION
With the development of communication and control tech-
nologies in modern power systems, cyber-threats can easily
gain access to PMUs and control units. As a result, distributed
voltage controllers in DNs are vulnerable to cyber-threats. The
focus of this paper is on FDI attacks targeting decision-making
units of voltage controllers. Before presenting the proposed
resilient solution, the following definition is introduced.
Definition 3.1 (Malicious voltage controller): An adversar-
ial voltage controller is said to be malicious if it updates
active/reactive power injections by taking arbitrary values as
its control input due to FDI attacks and sends the updates to
neighbouring controllers.
An adversarial voltage controller can transmit different
values to different neighbouring units through WSNs, aiming
to: i) slow down voltage control; ii) endanger voltage stability
in DNs; iii) overload the line thermal limits. Note that enabling
resilience of distributed voltage controllers requires the certain
connectivity of the communication network. As in [19], a
subset S is r−reachable if it contains a voltage controller that
at least r communication links from outside S. Then, a graph
is called r − robust if for any pairs of two disjoint subsets
S1 and S1, at least one of S1 or S1 is r− reachable. The set
of all agents is partitioned into a set of adversarial controllers
A and a set of normal controllers N/A. Based on the above
preparation, the following wMSR-VC algorithm is introduced.
A. wMSR-VC algorithm
Let (λi, λ̄i), (νi, ν̄i) and (µi, µ̄i), are the Lagrangian multi-
pliers associated with respectively (6), (7) and (9). Initialising
these multipliers by zeros, the wMSR-VC algorithm comprises
the following steps:
1) Dual update: Using a standard dual-ascent method [24],
the updates of λi = (λi, λ̄i) and ζi(k) = (νi, ν̄i, µi, µ̄i) are
given by, ∀i ∈ N
λi(k + 1) =
λi(k) + α[ vi(k)− v̄i
vi − vi(k)
]+ (11a)













where α and γ are step sizes. The operator [·]+ projects [·] onto
the positive range. Note that the updates of dual variables only
use local information and thus, the wMSR-based algorithm is
adopted in primal updates as follows.
2) the wMSR-based update: At each time step k, a list of
λj and ζj , j ∈ Ni is created at ith voltage controller.
• Information sorting: the values of λj and ζj , j ∈ Ni
including its own values of λi and ζi will be further sorted
in the list from the largest to the smallest.
• Suspicious information deleting: Comparing the values of
λj and ζj , j ∈ Ni with λi and ζi, ith voltage controller
removes the F largest and F smallest values from the
list where F = |A|. If the number of larger and smaller
values is less than F , then all of them are discarded.
3) Primal update: For the primal update, a closed-form
solution can be proposed due to the quadratic Lagrangian
function. Using the remaining values, the following power










/(wv + 1), (12)
• qvi update:











• Projection operation: in case of infeasible solutions, the
above power injections will be projected onto their cor-
responding feasible sets.
where [Hr]ij and [Hx/r]ij are ijth entry of Hr and Hx/r
respectively; Ri(k) ∈ Ni denotes the set of remaining values
after the wMSR-based update at time step k. As illustrated
in [11], Hr and Hx/r are the inverse of R and X/R that
are weighted Laplacian matrices. The sparsity of Hr and
Hx/r ensures the proposed wMSR-VC that is suitable for a
distributed implementation. Algorithm 1 specifies the details
of the proposed wMSR-VC.
Algorithm 1 wMSR-VC: resilient distributed voltage control
Initialize: Initialise λi(0) = [0, 0] and ζi(0) = (0, 0, 0, 0);
choose step sizes α and γ
wMSR-VC:
1: Collects local measurements of voltage magnitudes
2: Dual update:
a) Update λi(k) using (11a)
b) Update ζi(k) using (11b)
3: Transmits and receives the corresponding dual variables
with neighbouring PV units
4: Locally perform the wMSR-based operation: i) sorting
collected values ii) deleting F largest and F smallest
values
5: Update PV power injections according to (12) - (13)
6: Project the injections onto the feasible sets
7: return pvi (k), qvi (k);
k → k + 1 goes to Step 1
The proposed voltage regulation solution is a standard
dual-ascent method [24] with the wMSR-based operations.
As proved by [19], if the communication graph is (2F +
1) − robust, the proposed wMSR-VC algorithm ensures a
reliable voltage regulation even under adversary controllers.
The main challenge of the wMSR-based algorithm is the
design of a (2F+1)−robust communication graph. A virtual
communication graph is introduced, where the graph weights
are initialised following Hr and Hx/r. However, it may not
have (2F +1)− robust. To address this issue, following [21],
it can update a communication network to ensure its algebraic
connectivity with the level of r−robust being lower-bounded
by λ2/2. The communication network design is beyond the
scope of this study. Interesting readers can refer to [21].
Note that the introduced wMSR-based framework is a local
computation that is to process the received neighbouring
information. After this process, the updates in (12) - (13)
only use the information from the filtered set Ri(k) that is
sill a subset only containing neighbouring information. The
introduced framework will not change the distributed nature of
the solution, and (12) - (13) are still only updated by the local
interactions due to the sparsity of Hr and Hx/r. Therefore,
the scalability and flexibility of the solution are not affected.
IV. NUMERICAL STUDY
In this section, PV units are located at buses in a distributed
manner except for the substation bus on a modified IEEE
37-bus system, where the system information can be found
in [25]. An illustrative case is studied to demonstrate the
performance of the proposed wMSR-VC algorithm. The pro-
posed algorithm is compared with an existing solution without
resilience consideration. A 2.4 GHz Intel Core I5 PC was used
to perform this case study based on the Matlab/Matpower [26].
The per unit is used in the following case based on a 4.8
kV nominal voltage value. The range of voltage operation is
[0.95, 1.05] p.u. The PV system has the120 kW peak capacity
and 1.05× 120 kVA rated apparent power. The step-sizes α
and γ are chosen as 0.5 and 0.06 respectively. Although the
designed solution is based on the linear power flow model of
Section II-A, the real voltage magnitudes are used to update
dual variables, where the actual bus voltage magnitudes are
obtained by solving the fully AC power flow in Matpower.
A control diagram is shown in Fig. 1 that illustrates the
















Fig. 1. Control diagram of the proposed wMSR-VC algorithm
A. Static loading and PV generation
In this case, PV units are installed in the modified 37-bus
test feeder. The distribution system operating condition (load-
ing condition) is assumed to be static during the simulation
process. Suppose that the controllers at Node 3 and Node 16
are respectively compromised two kinds of FDI attacks where
one is a periodic function λi = sin(0.2 ∗ k) and another is a
linear increasing function νi = 0.2 ∗ k, where k is the time
step. Note that the types of these attacks cover various attack
problems introduced by [27], particularly for consensus-based
distributed control in microgrids. It includes continuous attacks
with bounded and unbounded magnitudes.
The proposed wMSR-VC algorithm is applied to regulate
voltage profiles into the voltage limit. Figs. 2 - 3 illustrate
the updates of dual variables under adversaries. It is shown
that the FDI attacks at Node 3 and Node 16 will not affect
the rest of the updates of dual variables. The corresponding
regulated voltage magnitudes are given in Fig. 4. As shown
in the results, although there are FDI attacks in the network
system, the proposed algorithm is immune to these attacks
and can still converge to a reliable and stable solution, where
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the voltage magnitude of each node is quickly regulated to its
limits, i.e., [0.95 1.05] p.u..






































Fig. 3. Convergence of dual variables ν using the proposed wMSR-VC
algorithm

























Fig. 4. Convergence of voltage magnitudes using the proposed wMSR-VC
algorithm
To further highlight the importance of resilience, the pro-
posed wMSR-VC algorithm is compared with a recently
distributed voltage control approach [11] without the resilience
consideration. Fig. 5 illustrates the evaluations of the network
loss, where both approaches are compared with an ideal result
without attacks using Yalmip [28]. It is clearly shown that





















Fig. 5. Convergence of the network loss, using using the proposed wMSR-VC
algorithm and the approach in [11]


























Fig. 6. Convergence of voltage magnitudes, using the proposed wMSR-VC
algorithm and the approach in [11]
the proposed algorithm ensures the solution that converges
to the correct result. However, the approach without the re-
silience consideration will be divergent due to the attacks. The
corresponding updates of voltage magnitudes are illustrated
in Fig. 6. The result in Fig. 6 shows that without resilience
consideration, the voltage magnitude will beyond the upper
limit at time step 5 if the voltage controllers are attacked.
Therefore, the FDI attacks result in divergent and unstable
voltage control. But the proposed solution ensures a stable
and reliable voltage regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
A resilient distributed control approach is proposed to online
voltage regulation by coordinating PV systems in distribution
networks while providing a reliable solution to the voltage
regulation problem in the control design. The focus of the
optimisation problem is on minimising network costs includ-
ing the network loss and PV curtailment cost for the cost-
effective service delivery. The optimisation problem is solved
distributively utilising only neighbouring information. Finally,
a wMSR-based algorithm is introduced to deal with FDI
attacks when there are malicious voltage controllers in the
networked system. The effectiveness of the proposed approach
is verified through numerical studies. The results show that
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our solution can achieve a remarkable performance under
adversaries, and therefore it is a cyber-secure solution.
Although this work verifies the performance of the wMSR-
VC algorithm, two aspects still need to be further investigated:
1) more detailed attack types and their corresponding models
should be considered in the proposed solution; 2) its effec-
tiveness should be analyzed by implementing the solution in
a real large-scale power system.
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